Binghamton University

The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
1-9-2010

Empirical and Dialogical Proofs of God's Existence in Laws 10
Lewis Trelawny-Cassity
Binghamton University--SUNY, lcassity@antiochcollege.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy
Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Trelawny-Cassity, Lewis, "Empirical and Dialogical Proofs of God's Existence in Laws 10" (2010). The
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 452.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/452

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator
of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.

Cassity Philol 10 p. 1

Empirical and Dialogical Proofs of God’s Existence in Laws 101
Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Binghamton University [lewcassity@hotmail.com]
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy meeting with the
American Philological Association January 9 2010, Anaheim
In the Republic Socrates states that there will be “no cessation of evils in cities” until
philosophers become kings (473d5). In the Laws Socrates’ provocative claim is revised to fit the
more moderate and traditional context of the later dialogue. The Athenian Stranger reformulates
Socrates’ statement in the following way: “there can be no rest from evils and toils for those
cities in which some mortal rules rather than a god (theos) . . . [so] we should obey whatever
within us partakes of immortality, giving the name “law” (nomos) to the distribution ordained by
intelligence (tēn tou nou dianomēn)” (713e4-714a2).2 The Athenian Stranger justifies this shift
from the rule of philosophers to the rule of law by arguing that the nomos of the Laws is to be
grounded in nous (957c5-7).
Book 10 of the Laws is intended to prove that the gods exist, care for us, and are not
persuaded by bribes (885b7-9). The arguments put forward concerning the gods in Book 10 are
described as “our noblest and best prelude (kalliston te kai ariston prooimion) on behalf of the
laws” (887c1). In this paper I want to investigate how Plato establishes the fact that nous, “god,
in the correct sense, for the gods” (897b2), exists. Some scholars have noted the “empirical”
character of Plato’s arguments for the existence of god in Laws 10.3 While empirical facts do
provide an important supplement to Plato’s theology, they do not comprise the whole or even
most important part of that theology. Instead of looking at the technical or empirical arguments
for god’s existence in Laws 10,4 I will examine how Plato’s commitment to dialogical
conversation, where partners in logos work towards a shared understanding of the subject at
hand,5 plays a foundational role in establishing the central principles of his theology.
It may seem peculiar that an emphasis on the centrality of dialogue in human life can lead
to theological commitments of any sort, but this claim makes more sense when one examines
1 I am grateful to Robert Guay, Randy Friedman, Anthony Preus, and Tamsin Trelawny-Cassity for comments on
this paper. Peter Cocozzella, Robert Guay, Anthony Preus, and Andrew Scholtz were kind enough to study the
text of Laws 10 with me during the summer of 2008, and I am grateful for their insights and dialogue.
2 Unless otherwise noted I am using the translation by Thomas Pangle, The Laws of Plato (University of Chicago:
Chicago, 1980). For the Greek I am using John Burnet, Platonis Opera (Oxford: 1907), but I have also benefited
from E. B. England’s The Laws of Plato (University of Manchester: Manchester, 1921) and Peter Steiner’s
Platon: Nomoi X (Akademie Verlag: 1992).
3 For a lucid account of how Greek philosophers used the gods to explain natural phenomena, see L. P. Gerson,
God and Greek Philosophy (Routledge: London, 1990). Eventually, however, doubt concerning the gods of the
polis led to disbelief in the celestial gods (Apology 26d-e; Clouds 380). In “Plato: The Creator of Natural
Theology,” International Studies in Philosophy 36:1 (2004) : 103-127, Gerard Naddaf notes, “in my opinion,
Plato’s greatest achievement is that all of the arguments that he employs in his proof of the existence of god are
empirical; he relies neither on a demiurge, nor on the world of intelligible forms” : 119.
4 This has already been well done by others: Gerard Naddaf, “Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology”; John J.
Cleary, “The role of theology in Plato’s Laws” in Plato’s Laws and its historical significance, ed. F. L. Lisi
(2001): 125-140; Robert Mayhew, Plato: Laws 10 (Claredon Press: Oxford, 2008).
5 My language and interpretation are here influenced by Gadamer’s early work Plato’s Dialectical Ethics (Yale
University Press: New Haven, 1991), originally written in 1931. For a good discussion of dialogue in the Laws
see Christopher Gill, “The Laws—Is it a real dialogue?” in Plato’s Laws: From Theory to Practice (Academia
Verlag, 2003): 42-47. Leo Strauss is probably right to characterize the level of dialectic in the Laws as “subSocratic,” The Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1975): 17.

Cassity Philol 10 p. 2

two central tenets of Plato’s theology: the priority of soul to matter and the existence of nous, a
term which is used synonymously with theos. By engaging partisans of ancestral piety and
scientific materialism in dialogue, Plato gets each party to agree to view the other as an ensouled
being capable of engaging in logos. Here, the soul, taken as an entity that can give and respond
to reasons, is shown to have a phenomenological priority to matter. Nous in its most exalted
sense is the orderer of the cosmos, but it is also the virtue, Reason, by which human beings orient
themselves in the world.6 Plato shows through the dialogue of Laws 10 that human beings are
able to orient themselves by nous through dialogical logos. Showing that nous exists as a
constant possibility of human conversation and collective deliberation falls short of a deductive
proof of the existence of either a cosmic demiurge or a traditional civic god. Nonetheless, this
dialogical evidence of nous in human conversation is the essential starting point and core of
Plato’s theology.
Problems with Empirical Proofs in the Laws:
Empirical arguments, that is, arguments that appeal to sense experience or perception for
support, do not form the heart of the theology of Laws 10 because the Athenian rejects such
arguments when they are offered by his Cretan interlocutor Kleinias. In response to those who
doubt the existence of the gods, Kleinias argues: “First, there’s the earth, the sun, the stars, and
all things, and this beautiful orderliness (diakekosmēmena kalōs) of the seasons, divided into
years and months” (886a2-4). Kleinias’ response is an empirically grounded version of
cosmological-teleological argument. Robert Mayhew, like Gerard Naddaf, expresses the
reasonable view that Plato’s own position “has a lot in common with what Kleinias presents
here.”7 However, the Athenian replies to Kleinias,
Now the arguments (logoi) of such men work (exergazdontai) the following effect:
when you and I adduce evidence (tekmēria) that the gods exist, bringing forward these
very things—sun and moon and stars and earth—as being gods and divine things, those
who are convinced by these wise men would say that these things are earth and stones,
and incapable of thinking anything about human affairs, however well decked-out
(peripepemmena) they may somehow be, with arguments (logoisi) that make them
plausible. (886d3-e2)8
The wise men are not susceptible to Kleinias’ cosmological-teleological logos because they are
under the sway of a particular logos that treats theological arguments with suspicion.9 This
suspicion renders them insusceptible to the “empirical” evidence (tekmēria) offered by Kleinias.
6 See Stephen Menn’s Plato on God as Nous (Southern Illinois University Press: Carbondale, 1995) for an
excellent discussion of Plato’s view of nous. Menn argues that nous is primarily to be understood as a virtue (20)
and should be translated as “Reason” not “mind.” Menn also argues that nous and the demiurge are the same
entity and, therefore, nous is an efficient as well as formal cause (43ff). In this essay, I am only examining nous
as a self-subsisting entity that souls can take up to orient themselves in the world. By taking up nous, souls
become demiurgic, efficient causes, and nous is thereby a remote efficient cause. I will avoid the more troubling
claim that nous can directly be an efficient cause, which would entail a complex discussion of whether the
demiurge and nous have souls.
7 Plato: Laws 10: 62.
8 I have emended the first sentence of Pangle’s translation here.
9 See LSJ on peripessō: A. bake a crust round : only metaph., disguise, “onomati p. tēn mochthērian” Ar.Pl.159 ;
“p. autas prosthetois” deck themselves out. with false hair, Id.Fr.321 ; “peplasmenōs to pragma p.” . Bato 7.6 ;
“p. ablabōs,” cover over Marius without hurting him, Plu.Mar.37 . . . also “rēmatiois periphtheis” cajoled by
words, Ar.V.668.
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This passage shows that assessing the existence of god cannot proceed merely by the
presentation of particular empirical facts, for particular empirical facts are only intelligible in
light of a more general explanatory logos at work in a human soul. The first step to revising the
corrupting atheistic logos is to remove the wise men’s distrust and suspicion.10
Thumos and Inauthentic Speech:
After introducing Kleinias to the atheistic arguments and securing Kleinias’ enthusiastic
consent to provide arguments for the existence of the gods as part of their overall legislative
endeavor (887b1-c4), the Athenian engages in a puzzling digression on thumos (anger or
spiritedness) (887c5-888a6).11 Thumos is a great obstacle to dialogue (888a6),12 and Plato works
in this section to free his interlocutors from this emotion in order to enter into an open
discussion. While the discussion of thumos may have rhetorical or political implications, it also
presents a methodological view of what counts as adequate knowledge. Analyzing an emotion
similar to thumos, phthonos (envy), Hans-Georg Gadamer writes,
The claim to knowledge is confirmed by arrival at a shared understanding. The other
person’s agreement is the test of whether the logos that is given is really able to
expound the facts of the matter in a convincing way. But here we find a specific
possibility of inauthenticity to which speech, as a possibility of human existence, is
subject . . . [true shared understanding requires] the exclusion of phthonos. Phthonos . . .
means concern about being ahead of others or not being left behind by others. As such,
its effect in conversation is to cause an apprehensive holding back from talk that presses
toward discovering the true state of affairs.13
In weaning his interlocutors from self-interested emotions like anger and jealousy, Plato subtly
directs them towards the true standard of knowledge in human life: open dialogue guided by
nous.
Plato, of course, is well aware of the danger and difficulty of open dialogue about the
gods. To those who would simply legislate against punishing heretics, the Athenian argues for
dispassionate discussion:
Yet it must be dared (tolmēteon). For it shouldn’t be that both are maddened at the same
time, at least, some of us by gluttony for pleasure, and others by spirited anger
(thumousthai) at such men. Let some such preliminary speech as the following proceed,
without spiritedness (athumos), for those who are thus corrupted in their thinking, and
let’s speak gently, quenching spiritedness (thumos), as if we were carrying on a
dialogue (dialegomenoi) with one such man. (888a2-7).

10 At this section of the dialogue, the atheists consider their position to be the “greatest prudence” (megistē
phronēsis) (886b7-8). This characterization is important, for the atheists believe that by not being taken in by the
arguments of the religious they are not only showing intellectual wisdom but also looking out for their own wellbeing.
11 Robert Mayhew holds that Kleinias, Megillus, and the Athenian have a right to be angry at the atheists (Plato:
Laws 10 : 73). Thomas Pangle argues that thumos is an important part of civic life, especially war and
punishment. (“The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s Laws,” The American Political Science Review.
Vol. 70, 1976 : 1059-1077, here p. 1061.”
12 The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato’s Laws”: 1061-1062.
13 Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: 44-45. While the Philebus, the subject of Gadamer’s interpretation here, and the Laws
differ stylistically, they are both typically classified as late works. My analysis here also points to a thematic
similarity.
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The characterization of the Athenian’s dialectical engagement with the atheists as tolmēros is
fitting, for it is both brave and bordering on the transgressive. While commitment to the
principles of open dialogue will loosen the atheist’s unthinking commitment to his materialist
explanation of the cosmos, Kleinias, Megillus, and the future citizens of Magnesia will be
reciprocally exposed to the atheist’s arguments. Dialectics are just as much a threat to traditional
piety as to atheism.14
After stating the prerequisites for a true dialogue, the Athenian conjures up a young
atheist to engage in dialogue.15 Far from encouraging the young atheist to quickly change his
opinion to a pious one on the basis of some empirical considerations, the Athenian notes the
transience of all human opinion and states:
If you should be persuaded by me, you’ll wait (perimeneis) until you have a doctrine
(dogma) about these matters that has become as clear as it can be, and meanwhile you’ll
investigate (anaskopōn) whether things are thus or otherwise, and will inquire
(punthanomenos) from others, and especially the lawgiver. (888c7-d2, cf. 888b2)
The Athenian’s recommendation, far from imposing his own theistic dogma on the young
atheist, is to perimenein and to investigate para te tōn allōn (with others). Far from being an
exhortation to orthodoxy, this section of the Laws advocates epochē and shared dialectical
inquiry.
Tuchē and Dianoia:
After these methodological exhortations about how to proceed in an open dialogue, the
Athenian accords the atheists’ argument more respect than before (888d8, cf. 887e8). The
Athenian has drawn Kleinias and Megillus into a situation where they must take the atheistic
position seriously. The Athenian says, “certain people say that all affairs (ta pragmata) come
into being, have come into being, and will come into being, by nature (phusei), by art (technēi),
and through chance (dia tuchēn)” (888e4-6). In response, Kleinias replies, “Isn’t that finely
expressed?” Like the young atheist, the old Kleinias is quick to reach an opinion about the
greatest matters, but the Athenian replies that they should “investigate (skepsōmetha) whatever it
is those people over there happen to think (tugchanousi dianooumenoi)” (888e7-889a2). In
addition to reminding Kleinias, as he did the young atheist, to thoroughly investigate arguments
before believing them, this passage foreshadows an important criticism of the atheists’ beliefs.
Those responsible for the atheistic doctrine happen or chance (tugchanein) to think the way they
do.
Plato links the atheists’ thinking with chance (tuchē) in two ways. First, because the
atheists hold that random matter in motion precedes soul, thinking itself has to be a product of
chance.16 Second, the atheists’ thinking is rooted in chance because it does not engage in open
dialogue with opposing viewpoints. Open discussion is the only way of securing knowledge, and
14 See also the use of dialegomenon and its close proximity to philosophein at 857d2-3; it is characteristic of the
Laws to note the importance of dialogue and philosophy as goals for human conduct, even though the level of
discourse in the Laws often fails to enact these standards.
15 Although the young atheists in Book 10 are specific to that book, the Athenian has used the device of a young
objector to the legislation elsewhere, compare 839b4.
16 Compare Descartes’ Mediation One: “According to their supposition [those who deny the existence of god],
then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other
means; yet since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause,
the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time” (trans. Cottingham, Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 2006) : 14.
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any form of speech which refuses this cannot lay claim to being free from arbitrariness. Both
ancestral piety and Presocratic materialism, therefore, are merely arbitrary viewpoints
determined by chance until they engage in critical dialogue.17
By examining Plato’s linkage of the dianoia of the atheists with tuchē, we reach the heart
of his criticism of the atheists. Rather than call forward empirical evidence, such as the motion of
the stars, to counteract the logos of the atheists, the Athenian tries to bring to their attention that
on which their logos depends: soul. The teaching of the atheists seeks to make a sharp distinction
between the works of nature and the works of art (or design) and to accord a greater value on the
former than the latter:18
It’s likely, they assert, that the greatest of them, and the finest, are produced
(apergazdesthai) by nature and chance, and the smaller by art, which taking from nature
the genesis of the greatest and first deeds (ergōn), molds and constructs all the smaller
things which we all call artificial. (889a4-8)
While the atheists ascribe the outcome of natural processes to blind chance, they cannot escape
using the soul-dependent language of craft (apergazdesthai) and rational agency (ergōn).19
The Priority of the Soul:
After presenting the atheistic teaching, the Athenian proposes that he and Kleinias share
in examining it together:
But now you tell me again, Kleinias (for you must share in the arguments (tōn logōn)):
the one saying these things ventures (kinduneuei) to hold that fire, water, earth, and air
are the first (prōta) of all things, and ventures to name these very things “nature,” and to
say that soul is something that comes later, out of these things. But it’s likely that he
doesn’t “venture,” (kinduneuein) but really makes these things manifest (sēmainein) to
us (hēmin) in his argument (tōi logōi). (891b8-c5)
The repetition of the verb kinduneuein in this passage carries a connotation of riskiness. The
atheists’ thinking is risky both in that it is determined by tuchē and thus proceeds in a haphazard
fashion, but also that it is dangerous in its effect on social norms. While the atheists hold that the
material elements are first, they nonetheless indicate or signify (sēmainein) their thoughts to an
audience of living beings, to us (hēmin), through a rational discourse. Through engaging this
logos as well as getting the atheists to recognize it to be a logos and therefore dependent on soul
will be an important part of the Athenian’s argumentation.
After showing that the atheists’ opinion rests on their conception of the posteriority of the
soul to matter, the Athenian exclaims, “Haven’t we discovered something like a source (pēgēn
tina anoētou doxēs) of the mindless opinion of those human beings who have at any time
engaged in investigations into nature?” (891c7-9).The play on “mindless,” is derogatory, but it is
also explanatory, for the atheists have no way to account for nous. Most commentators find the
17 The city of Magnesia is intended to be heavily shaped by persuasive legal preludes and incantations (epōidē), but
Plato makes clear that habitual virtue is not enough: see Book 12, 951b for the necessity of knowledge of other
ways of life and Book 7 816d9-e2 on the necessity of comedy. For a good analysis of the role incantations in the
Laws see Christoph Helmig, “Die Bedeutung und Funktion von epōidē in Platons Nomoi,” Plato’s Laws: From
Theory to Practice, ed. Scolnicov and Brisson (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2003).
18 In The Laws of Plato (University of Manchester Press, 1921), E. B. England suggests that technē be translated
“design.” (on 888e4ff.)
19 Seth Benardete notes well the link between technē and knowledge of causality, Plato’s “Laws : The Discovery of
Being (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2000) : 297. To the Platonic-Aristotelian way of looking at things,
to deny that technē is part of nature is to deny that the world can be known.
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proof of the priority of the soul in the passage discussing the various kinds of motion (893bff),
but the Athenian’s prefatory remarks to this proof are more important:
The arguments which have shaped the soul of the impious (hoi tēn tōn asebōn psukēn
apergasamenoi logoi) have asserted that what is in fact the first cause of the coming
into being and passing away of all things is not first, but has come into being later, and
that what in fact comes later comes earlier. That is why they have fallen into error
concerning the real existence of the gods. (891e4-9)
The impious’ logos states that soul is something which is fashioned (apergasamenein) out of the
elements, but the impious are unaware that their soul-denying logos shapes, fashions, and resides
in their own souls.20 While this argument does not affirm the priority of soul simply,21 it does
suggest that we should start with the things that are first for us, not the things that are first
simply.22 The appropriate starting point for a philosophical understanding of the universe, Plato
suggests, is recognition of the fact that those doing the analyzing, human beings, are ensouled
beings who come to know the world through logos.
Crossing the River:
By getting the atheists to accept the phenomenological priority of soul to body Plato has
already gone some way towards his goal of proving the priority of soul. Next, the Athenian
Stranger embarks on a methodological digression:
Consider therefore: suppose it was necessary for us, being three, to cross a very swift
flowing river, and I, happening (tugchanōn) to be the youngest of us and experienced
(empeiros) in many currents, said that I ought to try it first by myself, leaving you in
safety and investigating whether it is fordable for more elderly (prebuterois) men such
as you, or just how it is . . . [so] first I should question myself, while you listen in safety,
and then, after this I again should answer myself, and go through the entire argument
this way, until what pertains to soul is completed and it has been demonstrated that soul
is prior to body. (892d5-893a7)
On the surface this passage excludes Kleinias and Megillus from active participation in the
dialogue.23 While acknowledging the limitations of Kleinias and Megillus, however, this passage
points to what truly counts as the most important qualification for leading a dialogue. Age
qualifications are only a result of tuchē; what really counts is being experienced (empeiros).24 In
an argument which is ostensibly devoted to proving that the soul is older than the body, it is both
suggestive and ironic that the youngest member of conversation is the most adept at carrying out
the proof.
20 England correctly notes that “There is a lurking irony in his choice of the apergasamenoi to govern psuchē; he
thereby calls attention to the absurdity of regarding psuchē as a “production” of dead phusis.” (on 891e7)
21 As Aristotle notes in Metaphysics Delta chapter 11, priority admits of a variety of meanings. The Laws often
seems to conflate temporal priority and phenomenological priority by seeking to draw a link between what is
proteros and what is presbuteros. Gabriela Carone has suggested that presbuteros carries connotations of
dignity, Plato’s Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimensions (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005): 165;
while this may be true generally, the theme of old age is so prevalent in the Laws that I believe Plato uses this
term to signify older in time.
22 Nicomachean Ethics 1095b2-4, Physics 184aff.
23 This of course isn’t entirely the Athenian’s fault, for Megillus at times has shown wariness in submitting to
dialectical engagement (cf. 633a1-2).
24 The right of the older to rule the younger is a constant topic under examination throughout the Laws. See 690aff
where age is only one of the possible titles to rule in contrast to phronēsis which is characterized as rule kata
phusin.
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While Kleinias and Megillus do not actively participate in the technical discussion
concerning the types of motion, they do consent to the Athenian’s leadership in this difficult
task. The river of ever-changing human experience is hard to endure,25 and after hours of
discussion Kleinias and Megillus willingly allow the Athenian to guide the logos.26 The fact that
the technical proof of the priority of soul to body proceeds dialogically by means of the
Athenian’s conversation with himself shows that this form of inquiry remains at the heart of
Platonic inquiry, even if Megillus and Kleinias have not progressed far enough to become fullfledged participants.
Which Soul Drives the Cosmos?
After providing arguments which putatively prove the priority of soul to the elements, the
Athenian then asks how many souls exist (896e). Answering his own question, the Athenian
notes that there are at least two souls. The soul does good, “every time it takes as a helper
Intelligence (noun proslabousa)—god, in the correct sense, for the gods—it guides all things
towards what is happy, while when it associates with lack of intelligence it produces
(apergazdetai) in all things just the opposite to these” (897b1-5). Here, Plato identifies his true
god as nous. While the discussion so far has affirmed the existence of souls and nous, there is
still the question of which soul drives the cosmos.
Now we are at the point where Plato might be tempted to take empirical data into
consideration, for the Athenian Stranger states that if the motion of the heavens and the motion
of nous are similar, then the best soul is in charge of the cosmos. The Athenian asks,
So what nature does the motion of Intelligence (nous) possess, then? Now this, friends,
is a question that’s difficult to answer while speaking in a prudent way. That’s why it’s
just (dikaion), at this point, for you to take me (proslambanein) as a helper in
answering. (897d3-6)
While this passage notes the Athenian’s inequality with his interlocutors, the language describing
the actions of the interlocutors following the Athenian mirrors the soul’s following the
commands of nous. While much of Laws 10 is dedicated to providing a logos about the existence
of nous, here the interlocutors’ practical actions show in ergon that human beings are capable of
following nous by means of rational discussion and agreement.
The parallel between the soul following nous and the interlocutors following the
Athenian is followed by a reminder that empirical data is not capable of solving the problems
that need to be worked out at the level of self-critical discussion:
Let’s not make our reply by looking straight on, and thereby as if we were looking at
the sun, create night at midday—because we supposed Intelligence (nous) were ever
visible and adequately knowable by mortal eyes. One can see in more safety by looking
at an image of what is being asked about. (897d8-e2)
In language evoking the Phaedo (96c, 99d-100b), the Athenian notes that exclusive
concentration on perceptual phenomenon leads to the self-forgetting of the soul.
Instead of focusing on empirical phenomenon, the Athenian “recollects” their earlier
distinction between things that move in one place and things that move in many (893bff). The
Athenian notes,
Now of these two motions, the one that moves always in one place must necessarily
move around some center, being an imitation (mimēma) of circular things turned on a
25 Compare Timaeus 43a.
26 Compare Aristotle’s quotation from Hesiod in Nicomachean Ethics 1095b10-13.
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lathe, and it
must in every way have the greatest possible kinship and
resemblance to the revolution of Intelligence (nous). (898a3-6)
This passage, which is to prove crucial in linking the revolution of the stars to the revolution of
nous, is surprising because the class of things revolving in one place is an imitation of the rather
ordinary activity of a human being working some piece of wood on a lathe. Whereas one might
think that Plato would suggest that human activity be understood in terms of celestial motion or
abstract definitions of self-moving motion, this passage interestingly inverts the priority. The
abstract concept of circular motion around a fixed point is only intelligible as an imitation of
purposive human activity. That this is precisely Plato’s point is illustrated by repetition:
Surely, if we said that moving according to what is the same, in the same way, in the
same place, around the same things, towards the same things, and according to one
proportion (logon) and order characterized both Intelligence and the motion that moves
in one place—speaking of them as images (apeikasmena) of the motions of a sphere
turned on a lathe—we’d never appear to be poor craftsmen (dēmiourgoi) of beautiful
images in speech (logōi kalōn eikonōn). (898a8-b3)
In noting how spherical rotation and the operation of nous are similar and can be understood as
images of an intelligent craftsman shaping a sphere on a lathe, the Athenian and his interlocutors
become dēmiourgoi themselves. That the dēmiourgoi of the Laws are ordinary human beings and
not some cosmic creator is significant, especially in light of the opening question of the Laws.27
By pointing to how the interlocutors fashion their own rational discourse by analyzing the world
around them through the application of reason, Plato suggests the presence of the divine in
human rationality.
Only now are we prepared for the “empirical” question of whether or not the heavens are
driven around by a rational or irrational soul. Kleinias answers:
But stranger, from what has now been said at any rate, it isn’t pious (hosion) to say
anything other than that the soul—whether it be one or several—that has every virtue
drives things around. (898c6-8)
At first glance it is quite surprising, as John Cleary notes, that Kleinias “thinks that an appeal to
piety is sufficient to settle the question in favor of a good soul.”28 Isn’t there a firmer foundation
for the orderliness of the cosmos than this?
Piety and Proof:
In Book 7 of the Laws the Athenian outlines the educational system of Magnesia.
Examining some of his remarks on the study of astronomy may shed some light on why “piety”
is an important component of Platonic cosmology. Here, the Athenian mentions a supposedly
pious view which he considers “simply intolerable in every way”:
With regard to the greatest god (ton megiston theon), and the cosmos as a whole, we
assert that one should not conduct investigations nor busy oneself with trying to
discover the causes—for it is not pious (hosion) to do so. (820e-821a4)
This claim grounded in false piety is intolerable because human beings’ lack of astronomical
knowledge combined with their empirical experience of the heavens has led them to think that
the cosmos is disorderly and random.29 As Kleinias states,
27

“Is it a god or some human being (theos ē tis anthrōpōn), strangers, who is given the credit for laying down your

laws?” (624a).
28 John J. Cleary, “The role of theology in Plato’s Laws”: 132.
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For in my lifetime I myself have often seen the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and
certain others, never going along the same course, but wandering all over the place; and
I suppose we all know that the sun and the moon do these things all the time. (821c1-5)
In addition to standing in contradiction with Kleinias’ attempted cosmological-teleological proof
at 886d3-e2, this quotation shows that empirical observation of the heavens tells us nothing
definite about the existence of nous without a proper orientation to the phenomenon under
observation.
The Athenian claims in Book 7 that he has a “proof” (tekmērion) (821e3) and discusses
the possibility of a demonstration of this proof (822b7-9). Unfortunately, however, this proof is
not forthcoming. Instead, the Athenian abruptly and surprisingly declares that the laws
concerning education have come to an end (822d). While later passages in the Laws assert that
astronomy has an effect opposite to what the many believe, in that it instills a sense of wonder
(thaumata) (967a7-d2), these passages do not contain a demonstrative proof of how an intelligent
order underlies the sometimes wandering motions of the heavens.
It may be that Plato left out the proof discussed in Book 7 simply because its complexity
was too great for the legislative-minded audience of the Laws. It seems to me, however, that
Plato omits this proof either because he believes that the existence of nous does not need to rely
on a highly complex technical proof or because he thinks that the existence of nous is not strictly
demonstrable in this manner. Instead Plato relies on the sense of wonder that one experiences
when contemplating the cosmos with an open mind (compare in this regard 893d3) and the
existential possibility of nous coming to guide human conversation as it does over the course of
the Laws. Openness to nous’ operation in the heavens and in conversation is not, strictly
speaking, a logos. Instead it is a fundamental orientation to the world which in Plato’s view falls
under the name of piety. In this way Plato suggests that piety has, for human beings, an
existential priority to logical proof.
Whether Plato thought that piety, understood as affirming the phenomenological priority
of the soul and being open to the existential possibility of nous arising in dialogical conversation,
is enough to establish a coherent theology for Magnesia is an open question. Plato’s political
theology draws on a great deal more than this, including religious tradition, political necessity,
and perhaps empirical observations that were discussed in more detail in the Academy. It seems
to me, however, that the inherent orientation of open human dialogue towards nous, and not any
empirical observations, form the essential starting point from which any coherent elaboration of
Platonic theology must proceed.

29

Compare Aristophanes’ Clouds 607ff. for a comic account of how inaccurate astronomy leads to religious
impieties.

